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Abstract—Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) has been
generally regarded as an ideal network model for group
communications because of its specialty of instant
establishment. However, the security of MANET is still a
challenge issue. Although there are some existing security
schemes such as ARAN (Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc
Networks) protocol that makes use of cryptographic
certificate to provide end-to-end authentication during
routing phases, the overhead of security computation is still
a serious hurdle for real application. In this paper, we
propose a comparatively efficient scheme to perform ARAN
protocol, based on AODV, by using one-time signature in
place of conventional signature, aiming at achieving the
same level of security but improved efficiency. We also
provide two approaches to handle the authentication of
gratuitous route reply using delegation token and transitive
signature schemes.
Index Terms—MANET, Routing, AODV, Digital Signature,
One-time signature, Transitive signature.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET) are a specific
type of network. Just as its name implies, it is formed by
mobile nodes, such as laptops and PDAs. The
construction of the networks is generally impromptu,
therefore, networks can be formed whenever required and
topology is changing from time to time. Ideally, any
nodes satisfy general entering conditions will be accepted
as a legitimate member of the network. These properties
make MANET very suitable for group communications,
in which, a number of people get together, forming a
network to share documents and exchange conversations.
On the other hand, the wide-open environment makes
this network super vulnerable to inside and outside
attacks [1Error! Reference source not found.].
Especially in the case of routing [2], since the absence of
central control, it is extremely difficult to prevent nodes
from behaving improperly. Although there exist a large
number of MANET routing protocols [3,4,5, 8,11], most
of them were designed without any security
considerations (generally it is assumed that all nodes are
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friendly). Besides, the resource constraints (both
computation and bandwidth) of MANET put up great
difficulties over the deployment of security. Two widely
known reactive routing protocols are AODV (Ad hoc OnDemand Distance Vector Routing) [8] and DSR
(Dynamic Source Routing) [5], which are both very
efficient but are subject to a variety of attacks.
To reinforce the security of routing, ARAN [11] makes
use of cryptographic techniques to offer security in an
open-manage environment. Since the security is based on
public key cryptography, the efficiency of ARAN is
under suspicion. In this paper, we pursue the advantages
of one-time signature, which is more efficient in signing
and verification, to replace conventional digital signature
in protecting routing packets, though, at the same time,
maintaining the same level authentication.
In our previous work [12], we made use of delegation
token to enable the authentication of the gratuitous reply
in route discovery. In this paper, we introduce another
approach by using transitive signature scheme introduced
by Micali and Rivest [6].
The rest of the paper is organized as below. Section 2
briefly introduces the AODV routing protocol and ARAN
routing scheme. Section 3 describes the HORS one-time
signature scheme and its key generation process. Section
4 explains our scheme used to secure AODV, called
authenticated AODV. In section 5, we introduce two
approaches to be used to authenticate gratuitous route
reply. Section 6 discusses the security of our proposal.
The last section concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUNDS
In this section, we introduce the basics of the AODV
routing protocol and the ARAN authentication scheme.
A. AODV Routing
AODV is a simple and efficient on-demand ad hoc
routing protocol. Basically, it uses RREQ (route request),
RREP (route reply) and RRER (routsue error) messages
to accomplish route discovery and maintenance
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operations. It also utilizes sequence numbers to prevent
routing loops. Routing decision making is based on
sequence numbers and routes maintained in each node’s
routing table.
The routing operations of AODV generally consist of
two phases: route discovery and route maintenance.
Route discovery is performed through broadcasting
RREQ message. Whenever a node needs to send data
packets to a destination, it first checks if it has an existing
route in the routing table. If not, the source node will
initiate a RREQ and broadcast this request to all the
neighbours. Then neighbouring nodes will update their
routing table according to the received message.
When RREQ reaches the destination, a RREP will be
generated by the destination node as a response to RREQ.
The RREP will be transmitted back to the originator of
RREQ in order to inform the route. If an intermediate
node has an active route towards destination, it can reply
the RREQ with a RREP, which is called Gratuitous Route
Reply. The intermediate node will also send an RREP to
destination node. The RREP will be sent in reverse route
of RREQ if a bidirectional link exists.
Route maintenance is performed with two additional
messages: Hello and RRER messages. Each node
broadcast Hello messages periodically to inform
neighbours about its connectivity. The receiving of Hello
message proves that there is an active route towards the
originator. Each forwarding node should keep track of its
continued connectivity to its active next hops. If a link to
the next hop cannot be detected during a period of timeout, a RRER message will be broadcasted to inform the
loss of connectivity. On receiving this RRER, usually a
local repair will be performed just for maintenance. The
expired route will be deleted after the confirmation of its
unavailability.
From the security point of view, AODV requires at
least two security attributes: sender authentication at each
receiving node and routing message integrity. Message
integrity is of the most concern in AODV routing. In
route request broadcasting phase, each node has to check
the originator sequence number in the RREQ packet with
the one recorded in its routing table, and updates its
routing table to the newest one; in route reply phase,
instead of checking originator sequence number, each
node check the destination sequence number and keeps it
up-to-date. Any exploits of changing sequence number
will result in routing loops.
Besides message alteration, spoofing is also a serious
attack. A node forward RREP might claim itself to be
someone else, misleading the receiving nodes falsely
recording the fake identity as the next hop towards
destination. This is another way of disrupting topology by
creating route loops.
B. ARAN
ARAN was proposed by Sanzgiri et al in 2002,
targeting to combat attacks including unauthorized
participation, spoofed route signaling, alteration of
routing messages, replay attacks, etc. Similar to other
secure routing protocols, ARAN is also a security addson over on-demand routing protocols. It provides
© 2006 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
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authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation as
part of minimal security policy for ad hoc environment.
ARAN stands for Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc
Networks. It is motivated to detect and protect against
malicious actions by third parties and peers in an ad hoc
environment. ARAN is a security scheme, which can be
applied to any on-demand routing protocols. It takes the
advantages of PKI based digital signature scheme to
provide security features including authentication,
message integrity and non-repudiation.
ARAN consists of three stages: a preliminary
certification
process,
a
mandatory
end-to-end
authentication stage and an optional stage providing
secure shortest path. To deploy these three stages,
ARAN requires the use of a trusted certificate server T
and public key cryptography. Each node, before entering
the network, must request a certificate from T, and will
receive exactly one certificate after securely
authenticating their identities to T.
Routing operations of ARAN are performed using
three data structures: route discovery packet (RDP), reply
packet (REP), and error packet (ERR). Each of them
contains necessary routing information as well as the
public key certificate. When a node wants to initiate a
route discovery, it creates a signed RDP and broadcasts it
to the next hop. The next hop node verifies the
originator's signature. If it is authentic, it adds its own
certificate and signs the whole packet again. The
following hop node performs the same operation,
however, after the verification of all the signatures of the
received RDP it replaces previous hop node's signature
with its own. Operations repeated until the packet reaches
the target.
When the target node receives this RDP, it replies with
a REP. This packet is in the same format of RDP,
containing destination's signature and certificate. Each
forwarding node verifies the signature, removes previous
hop node's signature, and then adds its own outside the
packet. If this route reply reaches the originator, it is
guaranteed that the route found is authentic.
The authentication scheme provided by ARAN defends
against exploits using modification, fabrication and
impersonation. However, the use of public key
cryptography is very costly. The computational overhead
caused by signature generation and verification brings
tremendous burden for mobile nodes. A group of
malicious nodes may exploit this vulnerability to launch a
deny-of-service attack by simply broadcasting large
number of RDP packets. The receiving nodes have to
exhaust their computational resources to verify the
signature and then generate new ones. In addition, the
extra bandwidth used to transmitting certificate is also
another burden.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the one-time signature
scheme to be used in the construction of our
authentication scheme.
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B. One-Time Key Generation for Routing
Here, we describe the HORS one-time key generation
process.
● Notations:
h(), h, hi() – one way function
SignKn
–
conventional
digital

signature generated by node n
– one-time signature generated
<>Kn-1
by node n

Generation

A. HORS
As we observed, since ARAN use public key
cryptography to protect routing process, the time delay of
signature generation and verification is significant. In
general, significant time delay at each hop causes
unacceptable route acquisition latency. Thus, we are
looking for some digital signature schemes that maintain
all the traits of conventional DSS, but are efficient
enough in signature generation and verification.
The very first one-time signature scheme was
introduced by Lamport in 1979 [7], to sign just 1 bit
information. In 2002, Reyzin et al [10] proposed an onetime signature scheme, which is both efficient in signing
and verification, and generating short signatures. This
resulting scheme is called HORS, which stands for Hash
to Obtain Random Subset. The major operation in
signature generation is using a hashed message to obtain
a random subset to form the signature.
HORS stands for Hash to Obtain Random Subset. It
was proposed by Reyzin et al [10] in 2002, motivated to
provide an efficient signing algorithm. HORS consists of
three algorithms: key generation, signing and verification.
● HORS Key Generation
On constructing this scheme, several security
parameters are predefined. To sign b-bit messages, we
firstly pick t and k such that ⎛⎜ t ⎞⎟ ≥ 2b and then choose a
⎜k ⎟
⎝ ⎠
security parameter l, and a one-way hash function f that
operates on l-bit strings. To generate public key,
randomly generate l-bit string (s1, s2, …, st). Let vi = f(si)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. The resulting public key is PK = (k, v1, v2, …,
vt), private key is SK = (k, s1, s2, …, st).
● HORS Signature Generation
To sign a message m, with secret key SK = (k, s1, s2, …,
st), firstly let h = hash(m); then split h into k substrings h1,
h2,…, hk, of length log2t bits each; finally, interpret each
hj as an integer ij for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. The resulting signature is σ
= (si1, si2, …, sik).
● HORS Signature Verification
The verification is the same as the signature generation.
Suppose the verifier has the message m, signature σ =
(s’i1, s’i2, …, s’ik), and public key PK = (k, v1, v2, …, vt).
Firstly, let h = hash(m); then split h into k substrings h1,
h2,…, hk, of length log2t bits each and interpret each hj as
an integer ij for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. If for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, f(s’j) ==
vij, accept the signature; otherwise, reject the signature.
In HORS, the public key component can be used
multiple times. Signature generation requires only one
call to hash function. Verification requires k calls to hash
function. One impressive advantage of HORS is the
shorter signature size. For their most efficient
construction, the signature size can be reduced to 20480
bits.
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Figure 1. Secret key components hash chain.

●

Key Chain generation:
Suppose that the decision has been made regarding
security parameters l, k and t according to message length
b.
1.

Each node chooses t secret key components xj
(j=1,…,t) at random.

2.

Each node creates a n hash chain of length t
(see Figure 1):

3.

Public key components are obtained through a
one-way function h, namely vi = h(xi). We
assume that h is a hash function for simplicity.
4. Public key components are disclosed
periodically.
Generating a set of one-time keys to sign routing
messages has been discussed by Zhang in 1998 [15]. Two
schemes called chained one-time signature scheme
(COSP) and independent one-time signature scheme
(IOSP) were proposed. These two schemes activate us to
generate our novel scheme.
IV. AUTHENTICATED AODV ROUTING PROTOCOL
Based on the one-time signature scheme described
above, we propose a security adds-on for AODV, which
containing ARAN’s authenticated routing features. This
proposed protocol will provide following security
properties:
1. The target node can authenticate the originator;
2. Each receiving node can authenticate its
previous hop from which the routing message
coming;
3. Each intermediate node can authenticate the
sender for updating its routing table entry;
4. The hop count value is protected using hash
chain. It cannot be reduced by a malicious node,
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but could be increased more than one or retained
unchanged, as in SAODV [14].
To achieve security features listed above, we firstly
assume the existence of an offline CA, which issues
certificate for each node when entering the network. Thus,
each node possesses a public key and private key pair.
The conventional digital signature will still be used to
provide sender authentication, whereas the one-time
signature will offer end-to-end authentication.
A. Public Key Handling
The public key in our proposed protocol is
disseminated in two different ways. One aims at
providing keys for authentication among neighbors.
Another one tries to enable sender authentication during
message transmission.
End-to-end authentication is achieved through
neighbor authentication. Each node will generate a set of
one-time keys as described in section 3.1. The one-time
public key components are distributed locally among
neighbors. Since one-time keys can only be used once or
limited times, nodes need to update their one-time public
keys periodically. To guarantee that each neighboring
node has an authentic copy of node’s public key, the very
first public key, anchor, is distributed safely during
system setup. When a node enters the network, it signs its
anchor and broadcasts to its neighbors, along with its
certificate. Thus, successive one-time public keys can be
distributed in a more efficient manner by using Hello
message, which is broadcasted periodically. The
verification of updates is straightforward.
For example, the first secret key SK1 is (k, hn(x1), hn(x2),
n
h (x3), …,hn(xt)). The corresponding public key PK1 is (k,
hn+1(x1), hn+1(x2), hn+1(x3), …,hn+1(xt)). The second secret
key SK2 is (k, hn-1(x1), hn-1(x2), hn-1(x3), …,hn-1(xt)), thus the
corresponding public key PK2 is (k, hn(x1), hn(x2),
hn(x3), …,hn(xt)), which can be verified by hashing once
and comparing to PK1.
On the other hand, sender authentication is achieved
through conventional digital signature. The sender’s
public key is contained in its certificate which is obtained
when entering the network.
B. System Setup
This phase is used for initial key distribution (see
Figure 2). Suppose when a mobile node enters the
network, it is soon informed about the security
parameters agreed in this network. It then chooses its
secret key components and generates a hash chain
according to section 3.1. Then it performs as follows:
C. Route Discovery
Route Discovery is performed as in Figure 3. When
the originator (S) initiates a route discovery to a certain
destination, it simply generates a signature over the
N:

Choose secret key component SK
Construct hash chain
The first public key component PK1 is the Anchor

Figure 2. Initial key distribution and authentication (in System Setup)

© 2006 ACADEMY PUBLISHER

RREQ, using conventional digital signature.
S

RREQ:

A

S:

B

C

D

So = SignS<RREQ, top hash, hop count>

SÆ*: So, CertS

A:

hop count = 1

AÆ*: So, <h(So)>KA-1, CertS
B:

hop count = 2

BÆ*: So, <h2(So)>KB-1, CertS
C:

hop count = 3

CÆ*: So, < h3(So)>KC-1, CertS

RREP:

D:

check h(MAX_HOP_COUNT – HOP COUNT) (So ) = top hash
Sd = SignS<RREP, top hash, hop count>

DÆC: Sd , CertD
CÆB: Sd, <h(Sd)>KC-1, CertD
BÆA: Sd, < h(Sd)>KB-1, CertD
AÆS: Sd, < h(Sd)>KA-1, CertD

Figure 3. Route Request and Route Reply

Upon the first hop node (A) receives the RREQ, it
firstly verifies the signature of the originator. If the
signature is fine, the neighboring node hashes the
received message So again and generates its own
signature over it. This time, the signature is generated
using HORS one-time signature scheme. Then the whole
message is re-transmitted to second hop. From now on,
there are two signatures. One is over So, another is over
the hash of So.
Once the second hop node (B) receives this double
signed RREQ, it firstly verifies the pervious hop (A)
using public key of A (which might receive through Hello
messages). If the one-time signature is fine, B hashes So
one more time and creates a signature over the hash to
replace the signature of A. Then this new message is
broadcasted to next hop neighbors. Notice that the
verification of conventional signature could be delayed.
Only if both conventional signature and one-time
signature are fine, does B update its routing table entry
according to RREQ. These operations repeated until
RREQ reaches the destination.
When RREQ reaches the destination, the destination
node performs verifications the same as each intermediate
node. Then a RREP is generated and signed the same as
RREQ. Each intermediate node will transmit it back to
the originator through the reverse route and same
operations are performed along the route.
V. HANDLING GRATUITOUS ROUTE REPLY
In AODV, gratuitous route reply enables an
intermediate node to reply RREQs which it has an active
route towards the destination. This feature is optional in
AODV, though turning on this feature will highly
enhance the efficiency of routing discovery. However, to
enable this feature, additional technique is needed. The
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AÆB: <A, TokenA>
TokenA = <A, B, Pra, ra, ta>Ka-1

S
RREQ:

Figure 4. Delegation Token

A

B

C

S:

So = <RREQ, hop count, PKS, TokenS>KS
TokenS = < S, PKS, rS, tS>KS-1
SÆ*: So

D

-1

A: hop count = 1
AÆ*: So, h(So), <h(So)>KA-1

conceptual idea is that since we used digital signature to
protect each routing message at each hop, for an
intermediate node to reply RREQs instead of the
destination, the intermediate node should be able to sign
the RREQ properly on behalf of the destination.
A. Delegation Using Token
To solve this problem, we borrow the idea from proxy
signature proposed by Varadharajan et al. [14], in which
delegation is enabled by using a warrant. The warrant
appears as a delegation token, containing the identities of
primary signer and proxy signer, the privilege (Pra) given
to proxy signer, an identifier (ra) used by primary signer,
and a timestamp (ta). This delegation token is signed by
the primary signer.
We simplify above delegation token into three fields
(See Figure 4): the destination's identity, an identifier ra
and a timestamp ta. It is possible because the token does
not need to be designated to certain nodes. Any node that
has received the token from a target is automatically
proved to be having an active route towards the target.
Otherwise, it would not be able to obtain this token. The
token is signed by the creator using our IOS signature for
our scheme.
The token enabled routing process is shown in Figure
5. If the gratuitous route reply option is turned on, nodes
broadcasting RREQs must create tokens for gratuitous
route reply delegation. The whole message including the
token will be signed again, using the same public key as
signing the token. Then, the originator broadcast the
RREQ as usual.
Upon receiving the RREQ, node processes the
authentication as normal. Then it checks the timestamp to
see if the token has expired. If the token is valid, the
nodes will store the token for future use.
The originator firstly checks if this RREP was created by
destination or by intermediate node. If it is a gratuitous
route reply, the originator checks the timestamp to
determine if the route is still active. Then the token and
the RREP will be authenticated as described before.
B. Delegation Using Transitive Signature Schemes
References
In this section, we introduce another approach for
enabling delegation by using transitive signature scheme.
Transitive signature scheme was firstly envisioned by
Mciali and Rivest [6] in 2002. It was originally used to
dynamically build an authenticated graph, edge by edge.
The signer, having secret key sk and public key pk, can at
any time pick a pair i, j of nodes and create a signature of
{i, j}, thereby adding edge {i, j} to the graph. In addition,
given a signature of an edge {i, j} and a signature of an

B: hop count = 2
BÆ*: So, h2(So), < h2(So)>KB-1
C: hop count = 3
CÆ*: So, h3(So), <h3(So)>KC-1
RREP:

check h(MAX_HOP_COUNT-Hop_Count)( So)=Top_ Hash
SC = <RREP, Top_ Hash, Hop_Count, PKC, TokenD>KD-1
TokenT = < D, PKD, rD, tD>KD-1
CÆB: SC
C:

BÆA: SC, h2(SC), <h2(SC)>KB-1
AÆS: SC, h3(SC), <h3(SC)>KA-1

Figure 5. Token enabled route Request and Gratuitous Route Reply.

edge {j, k}, anyone in possession of the public key can
create a signature of the edge {i, k}.
We make use of the transitive signature scheme proposed
by Micali and Rivest [6] to construct our design.
z

Setup
Each node in the network agrees with the following
parameters:
- large prime p and q such that q divides p-1
- two generates g and h of subgroup Gq of order q
∈Zp* such that the base-g logarithm of h modular
p is infeasible for others to compute.
Then each node ni does the followed:
1. randomly choose two values xi and yi from Zp*;
2. compute αi = xi mod q and β i = yi mod q ;
3.

compute vi = g i h i mod p ;

4.

broadcast

5.

upon the receipt of

αi

x

y

and

βi

to node’s neighbors.

αj

and

βj

from each

neighbor, node i compute:

αij = xi − x j mod q

and
6.

β ij = yi − y j mod q

node i records in its memory the quadruple:

( vi , v j , αij , β ij )

z

Sign
To sign the path between node A and node B, node B
must have received α A , β A , and v A from node A. Then
node B computes the signature as:

α AB = x A − xB mod q
β AB = y A − y B mod q

and

Node B publishes the quadruple as the signature:
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( v A , vB , α AB , β AB )
z

Verify
Any node can verify the previous signature by
checking:

v A = vB g α AB h β AB mod q
z

Path Composing
When the next hop node C receives the signature
between node A and node B, it firstly verifies the validity
of the signature in order to ensure that node B does have
an active route towards node A. Then node C can
generate a transitive signature over the received one so as
to incorporate itself into the path.
Given signature ( v A , vB , α AB , β AB ) , node C retrieves
the quadruple

( vB , vC , α BC , β BC )

and computes the new transitive signature

( v A , vC , α AC , β AC )

as:

α AC = α AB − α BC mod q

β AC

= x A − xC mod q
= β AB − β BC mod q

and

= y A − yC mod q
The signature for the path from node A to node C is:

( v A , vC , α AC , β AC )

The use of the transitive signature scheme to enable the
route aggregation has one big benefit. It enables the
authentication of both originator and gratuitous replier in
one signature. In delegation by warrant, the token is
signed with the routing packet by the gratuitous replier.
Thus, the authentication of the gratuitous replier has to be
done by verifying the conventional signature, and the
token which is signed using conventional signature
scheme has to be verified at the same cost. By using
transitive signatures, the originator and replier can be
authenticated at the same time.
However, the use of the transitive signature scheme to
enable gratuitous reply authentication requires the cost of
exchanging public key quadruples and computing the
path signatures between neighboring nodes. It is
considered to be the major drawback of this application.
VI. DISCUSSION AND IMPROVEMENT
The most outstanding point of this scheme is the
efficiency of one-time signature generation and
verification at each hop. The same as HORS [10], each
time, key generation requires t evaluation of one-way
function. The secret key size is lt bits, and the public key
size is flt bits, where fl is the length of the one-way
function output on input of length l. The signature is kl
bits long. There is a tradeoff between t and k, since the
public key size will be linear in t, and the signature size
and verification time will be linear in k.
The security of this scheme stems from the system
setup phase. In this phase, a conventional digital
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signature is used to guarantee the authenticity of the first
public key component. This can be achieved through
using public key certificate issued by an offline CA,
namely, each node must present a creditable identity
when entering the network. The signature verification and
generation may be inefficient, but since this message is
broadcasted locally, it should be practical for each node.
The update of public key component is done along
with Hello message, which is broadcasted periodically.
Since the public key component comes from a hash chain,
the verification is straightforward – the previous public
key component is used to authenticate the new one. The
trustworthiness of the new public component depends
totally on the security of one-way hash function and the
digital signature over anchor. The anchor is used only
once. It is replaced by newly coming public key
component after the first Hello message is broadcasted. In
this way, nodes only need to do one hash to authenticate
new public key component each time, which is much
more efficient than hashing repeatedly back to anchor.
Sender authentication is performed with some
compromise of efficiency, using conventional DSS. This
method is much more secure than in SAODV, because in
SAODV, the originator simply signs on its own public
key without the support of PKI. Attackers can easily
forge RREQ and RREP packets during transmission. On
the other hand, the efficiency can be enhanced to some
degree through the way that each node verifies
conventional digital signature after broadcasting routing
packets. Therefore, these will be no verification delay.
Only both conventional signature and one-time signature
is fine, will the routing table entry be updated.
Double signing over the received message does not
provide more security than single signature from
cryptographic point of view. Nevertheless, it provides
non-repudiation hop-by-hop, which can be sued as an
evidence for future intrusion detection. This thought
comes from ARAN. It is considered as impractical
because the use of conventional signature schemes. If
there is a technique to produce even shorter signature in
more efficient manner, this scheme can be extended to
allow each node to sign on the received messages.
One significant drawback of one-time signature is that
it can sign only predefined number of messages, which,
in our scheme, is limited by the size of hash chain n. We
generally consider it is not a serious problem, because
nodes in MANET are mobile devices which are leaving
and entering the network frequently. Consequently, the
hash chain will be refreshed. In this sense, we can set n to
a proper value according to network scale and average
active time of nodes.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a novel scheme to implement
ARAN protocol based on AODV routing protocol.
However, it is more efficient than original ARAN in
signature generation and verification by using HORS
one-time signature in place of conventional digital
signatures. We enable the protections for gratuitous route
reply feature, under the concept of proxy signature’s
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delegation by warrant, as well as the route aggregation
using transitive signature schemes. The warrant here is
represented as a token, which contains creator’s identity
and public key, and is signed by the creator.
The security of our scheme needs to be enforced by
performing conventional digital signature. With the help
of asymmetric cryptography or public key certificate, we
can ensure the authenticity of mobile nodes and the
secure distribution of initial keys. Hence, the security of
sub-sequential keys can be guaranteed by one way hash
chain.
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